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Abstract—In this paper we propose a computational method-
ology for assessing the impact of trust associated to sources of
information in scientific enquiry activities building upon recent
proposals of an ontology for situational understanding and results
in computational argumentation. Often trust in the source of
information serves as a proxy for evaluating the quality of the
information itself, especially in the cases of information overhead.
We show how our computational methodology, composed of an
ontology for representing uncertain information and sources, as
well as an argumentative process of conjecture and refutation,
support human analysts in scientific enquiry, as well as high-
lighting issues that demand further investigation.
Index Terms—computational models of trust, scientific enquiry,
uncertainty
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals and organisations have access to a rich and di-
verse source of information that can be exploited for scientific
enquiry—i.e. relating relevant information and form logical
conclusions, as well as identifying gaps in information in
order to answer a given query. However, an open and enduring
problem resides in managing the impact of trust measurements
in such activities.
We propose a computational methodology for assessing the
impact of uncertainty in sources and information in scientific
enquiry to support human analysts with a sound ontology and
the ability to reason with partial information. In this paper we
extend a previous proposal [5] to (1) not only to represent
the trust in the sources, but also the quality of information
provided by such sources; and (2) a computational model of
handling inconsistencies and uncertain sources. We ground our
preliminary investigation in a case study on the alleged links
between vaccination and autism that will help us describing
our desiderata for supporting human analysts (Section II).
We then review our previous proposal [5] and other relevant
literature in Section III. We propose a methodology satisfying
those desiderata in Section IV and in Section V we present
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Fig. 1. A message on social media suggesting a research paper linking MMR
vaccination and autism
contributions to support scientific enquiry with uncertain in-
formation and sources as part of the process of conjectures
and refutation [17] embodied by formal argumentation with
specific reference to our case study. As this preliminary work
is part of an ongoing investigation, we will extensively discuss
related work and future directions in Section VI.
II. MOTIVATIONAL SCENARIO AND DESIDERATA
Let us suppose that an individual—Alex—needs to answer
the question “Do MMR vaccinations cause autism?” Like any
other individual living at the beginning of the XXI century CE,
Alex might rely first on the social networks of their choice.
For instance, let us suppose that Alex encounters the message
depicted in Figure 1,1 where John shares a link to a research
paper.
Alex follows the link and notices that it refers to a short
conference abstract with little evidence attached. However,
from a simple search on their favourite engine, Alex finds [24]
(now retracted), where Wakefield et al. present an early report
investigating the case of 12 children experiencing a loss of
acquired skills, including language. The findings of the study
are:
Onset of behavioural symptoms was associated,
by the parents, with measles, mumps, and rubella
[MMR ed.] vaccination in eight of the 12 children,
with measles infection in one child, and otitis me-
dia in another. [. . . ] Behavioural disorders included
autism (nine), disintegrative psychosis (one), and
possible postviral or vaccinal encephalitis (two).
From this, Alex might infer—improperly applying a fre-
quentist inference2—that [24] supports the conclusion that
1Although this message has been created by the authors, it is based on
several messages that can be found on platforms like Twitter or Facebook.
The authors chose not to display original social media messages as that would
have been unethical.
2See [10] for instance on issues associated to statistical inferences and
human psychology: further discussions on this topic are outside the scope of
the present paper.
there is an association between MMR vaccination and autism
with probability 812 “ 0.67.
Alex also notices that [24] appears with a retraction notice
[21] that states: “it has become clear that several elements of
the 1998 paper by Wakefield et al are incorrect.”
The Editors of the Lancet [21] suggest therefore that the
methodology followed by [24] was not correct, without com-
menting on the findings. Hence, Alex searches for more recent
papers that cite [24] and finds [15], whose findings are:
Of the 537,303 children in the cohort (represent-
ing 2,129,864 person-years), 440,655 (82.0 percent)
had received the MMR vaccine. We identified 316
children with a diagnosis of autistic disorder [. . . ]
There was no association between the age at the time
of vaccination, the time since vaccination, or the
date of vaccination and the development of autistic
disorder.
Applying the same improper frequentist inference—on the
data available in [15]—Alex now infers that [15] supports
the conclusion that there is an association between MMR
vaccination and autism with probability 316440,655 “ 7.17e´04.
Assuming the logical axiom of tertium non datur this leads
Alex to imply that [15] supports the conclusion that there is
not an association between MMR vaccination and autism with
probability 440,655´316440,655 “ 0.9992.
In order to develop a computational machinery for sup-
porting Alex’s scientific enquiry with conflicting informa-
tion and uncertain sources, we first need to identify prin-
cipled desiderata. As identified in [5], (Des1) trust has
to be context-dependent: the level of trust we have in
@JohnSmith1234567890 when it comes to MMR vacci-
nation should not impact the level of trust we have in
@JohnSmith1234567890 on another topic, e.g. celebrities
lifestyle.
Moreover, the second desideratum identified in [5] states
that (Des2) trust needs to be expressed through an ordinal
scale, i.e. it should be possible to determine whether, given
the same context, a source of information is more trustworthy
than another.
In this paper, we discuss two further desiderata. The third
desideratum (Des3) states that information reported by sources
should be linked to a measurement of uncertainty that needs
to be expressed through an ordinal scale.
Finally, the fourth desideratum (Des4) is that information
reported by sources should be subjected to a scientific enquiry
process of conjectures and refutation. Also information related
to the contextual trust in the source of information should not
be exempt from such a process: it must be possible to criticise
and refute the level of trust on a specific source.
III. BACKGROUND
A. SitUTrustOnto
Figure 2, together with Table I, depicts SitUTrustOnto,
the ontology of trust for situational understanding proposed in
TABLE I
ORL RULES IN SitUTrustOnto.
R1 :
$’&’%
Trustp?xq^DefaultTrustp?yq^
implementsDefaultp?x,?yq^
TrustDescriptorp?tq^
hasDescriptorp?y,?tq
,/./-Ñ hasDescriptorp?x,?tq
R2 :
$’’’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’’’%
Sourcep?xq^Sourcep?yq^
contradictsp?x,?yq^
Trustp?axq^Trustp?ayq^
hasTrustSameSourcep?x,?axq^
hasTrustSameSourcep?y,?ayq
^Queryp?qq^hasQueryp?ax,?qq^
hasQueryp?ay,?qq^
hasDescriptorp?ay,?tyq^
hasDescriptorp?ax,?txq^
equalTrustThanp?tx,?tyq
,/////////////./////////////-
Ñ Issuep?xq
R3 :
$’’’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’’’%
Sourcep?xq^Sourcep?yq^
contradictsp?x,?yq^
Trustp?axq^Trustp?ayq^
hasTrustSameSourcep?x,?axq^
hasTrustSameSourcep?y,?ayq
^Queryp?qq^hasQueryp?ax,?qq^
hasQueryp?ay,?qq^
hasDescriptorp?ay,?tyq^
hasDescriptorp?ax,?txq^
lowerTrustThanp?tx,?tyq
,/////////////./////////////-
Ñ Issuep?yq
R4 : tIssuep?xq^Sourcep?yq^contradictsp?x,?yqu Ñ Issuep?yq
[5].3 An ontology can be described using tractable sub-sets of
First Order Logic, which take the name of Description Logics.
In the following we will be using a specific Description Logic
named ALI`.
An ontology comprises two components [1]: the vocabulary
(TBox) and the assertions about individuals (ABox). The
vocabulary consists of concepts, which denote sets of indi-
viduals; and roles, which denote binary relationships between
individuals.
Elementary descriptions are atomic concepts and atomic
roles. Complex descriptions can be built from them inductively
with concept constructors. In abstract notation, we use the
letters A and B for atomic concepts, the letter R for atomic
roles, and the letters C and D for concept descriptions. Concept
descriptions in ALI` are formed according to the following
syntax rule: C,DÑ A (atomic concept) | J (universal concept)
| K (bottom concept) | C[ D (intersection) | @R.C (value
restriction, or range) | DR.J (limited existential quantification,
or domain). R´ denotes the inverse role; roles can be transitive
and symmetric. The syntax of ALI` can clearly be presented
using the OWL 2 Web Ontology Language.4 Semantics are
given—as usual—by means of an interpretation.
For ease of representation, in the following we will use a
graph-based syntax, where nodes are either atomic concepts
or individuals (identified by q ), and edges are labelled with
3Available at https://goo.gl/DLq6dz
4https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/
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hasQuery ≡
hasTrustSameQuery—
hasSource ≡
hasTrustSameSource—
hasDescriptor ≡
hasTrustSameDescriptor—
(symmetric)
equalTrustThan
(transitive) higherTrustThan ≡ 
(transitive) lowerTrustThan—
(symmetric)
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♦ Unreliable
type
type
type
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Fig. 2. Graphical representation of SitUTrustOnto: nodes with q are individuals, otherwise atomic concept. Edges are labelled with is-a (subclass relations),
with type (membership assertion); and with atomic roles. For instance, (transitive) higherTrust ” (transitive)lowerTrustThan´ describes the role
higherTrust with domain and range Trust, such as it is the inverse of lowerTrust . Issue represents the class of Sources that do require further
investigation as they are deeemed to be problematic.
TABLE II
THE ADMIRALTY CODE [18, P.30]
Reliability of the Source
A Completely reliable
B Usually reliable
C Fairly reliable
D Not usually reliable
E Unreliable
F Reliability cannot be judged
Credibility of the Information
1 Confirmed by other sources
2 Probably true
3 Possibly true
4 Doubtful
5 Improbable
6 Truth cannot be judged
one of the following labels: is-a (representing sub-concept
relation), type (membership assertion), or R (roles).
Moreover, as presented in [12], ORL is a language for
expressing Horn clause rules that extends the OWL language
in a syntactically and semantically coherent manner. A rule has
the form antecedent Ñ consequent, where both antecedent
and consequent are conjunctions of atoms written a1^. . .^an.
Variables are prefixed with a question mark—e.g. ?x. The
model-theoretic semantics for ORL is an extension of the
semantics given by an interpretation. A rule is satisfied by an
interpretation iff every binding—mapping to elements of the
domain—that satisfies the antecedent also satisfies the con-
sequent. An interpretation satisfies an ontology iff it satisfies
every axiom (including rules) and fact in the ontology [12].
The concept Source in Figure 2 contains sources of infor-
mation, e.g. blog posts, twits, scientific papers. . . . The concept
Query describes the situation that needs to be understood,
e.g. specific queries an analyst has to address, such as “Do
vaccinations cause autism?”
The concept TrustDescriptor contains trust descriptors: given
our interest in supporting human analysts and not to replace
them, we chose to rely on the admiralty code [18] that
identifies the six descriptors listed in Table II (left). Figure
2 shows the six individuals belonging to TrustDescriptor, and
their relationships expressed by equalTrustThan—identifying
that two descriptors are equivalent; higherTrustThan and
lowerTrustThan—expressing ordering, and thus satisfying
(Des2); and incomparable—when two descriptors cannot be
compared.
The concept Trust describes the relationship between a
source of information, a query, and a trust descriptor, thus
providing the context in which to assess the trust in a source
of information for a given query. Please note that there is no
role linking directly Source to TrustDescriptor, nor Source to
Query, thus satisfying (Des1). Moreover, DefaultTrust is a sub-
concept of Trust that provides default trust accounts between
some types of queries and some sources of information. For
instance, we might want to express that scientific papers
addressing medical queries generally have high trust, and thus
we can create a specific individual belonging to DefaultTrust.
This means that when a new piece of information is added
to the ontology, we can exploit defaults for assessing its
trustworthiness using the rule R1 from Table I.
Finally, since different Sources can contradict each other,
Issue is populated by the means of rules R2, R3, and R4 of
Table I. This is the case where two sources of information
q a and q b, related to the same query, contradict each other,
i.e. q a contradicts q b, and either they have the same level
of trust (equalTrustThan), cf. R2 in Table I; or the trust in
q a is lowerTrustThan q b, cf. R3 in Table I. This is based
on the assumption that if q a contradicts q b, but q a is more
trustworthy than q b, an analyst would accept q a and discard
q b. Finally, if a source of information also belong to Issue,
also the sources it is in conflict with belong to Issue (cf. R4
in Table I.
B. Handling conflicting information through argumentation
A widely used approach to handle uncertain and conflicting
information is argumentation theory, where arguments can
represent reasons and inferences in favours of conclusions.
Among other approaches, in deductive argumentation each
argument is defined using a logic, and in the following we
adopt the simple, but elegant logic proposed in [2]. Thus,
we let L be a logical language. If α is an atom in L, then
α is a positive literal in L , and  α is a negative literal
in L. For a literal β, the complement of the positive literal
β “ α is β “ α (resp. if β “ α is not a positive literal, its
complement is the positive literal β “ α).
A simple rule is of the form α1 ^ . . . ^ αk Ñ β where
α1, . . . ,αk ,β are literals. A simple logical knowledge base is
a set of literals and a set of simple rules. Given a simple
logic knowledge base, ∆, the simple consequence relation $s
is defined, such that ∆ $s β if and only if there is a rule
α1^ . . .^αnÑ β P ∆ and @i either αi P ∆ or ∆$s αi . Now,
given Φ Ď ∆ and a literal α, x∆,αy is a simple argument if
and only if Φ $s α and EΦ 1 Ĺ Φ such that Φ 1 $s α. Φ is the
support (or premises, assumptions) of the argument, and α is
the claim (or conclusion) of the argument. Given an argument
a“ xΦ ,αy, the function Supportpaq returns Φ , and Claimpaq
returns α.
For simple arguments a and b we consider the following
types of simple attack:
‚ a is a simple undercut of b if there is a simple rule α1^
αk Ñ β in Supportpbq and there is an αi P tα1, . . . ,αku
such that Claimpaq is the complement of αi ;
‚ a is a simple rebut of b if Claimpaq is the complement
of Claimpbq.
Some arguments can be instances of argumentation schemes
[25], [27], viz. abstract reasoning patterns commonly used in
everyday conversational argumentation, legal, scientific argu-
mentation, etc. Schemes have been derived from empirical
studies of human argument and debate. They can capture
traditional deductive and inductive approaches as well as
plausible reasoning. Each scheme has a set of critical questions
that represents standard ways of critically probing into an
argument to find aspects of it that are open to criticism.
For instance, the following is the argumentation scheme for
argument from correlation to cause:
Correlation Premise: There is a positive correlation between
A and B.
Conclusion: A causes B.
Critical questions are:
CQ1: Is there really a correlation between A and B?
CQ2: Is there any reason to think that the correlation is any
more than a coincidence?
CQ3: Could there be some third factor, C, that is causing both
A and B?
For the purpose of this paper, let us also recall the argu-
mentation scheme for argument from witness testimony:
Position to Known Premise: Witness W is in a position to
know whether A is true or not
Truth Telling Premise: Witness W is telling the truth (as W
knows it).
Statement Premise: Witness W states that A is true (false).
Conclusion: Therefore, A may be plausibly taken to be true
(false).
with associated the following critical questions:
CQ1: Is what the witness said internally consistent?
CQ2: Is what the witness said consistent with the known
facts of the case (based on evidence apart from what the
witness testified to)?
CQ3: Is what the witness said consistent with what other
witnesses have (independently) testified to?
CQ4: Is there some kind of bias that can be attributed to the
account given by the witness?
CQ5: How plausible is the statement A asserted by the
witness?
The Argument Interchange Format+ (AIF+) [7], [19], [20]5
is the current proposal for a standard notation for argument
structures. It is based on a graph that specifies two types
of nodes: information nodes (or I-nodes) and scheme nodes
(or S-nodes). These are represented by two disjoint sets,
NI Y NS “ N and NI X NS “ H, where information
nodes represent claims, premises, data, etc., and scheme nodes
capture the application of patterns of reasoning belonging to
a set S “ SRYSCYSP YSY with SR, SC , SP , SY pairwise
disjoint. Reasoning patterns can be of three types: rule of
inference SR; criteria of preference SP ; criteria of conflicts
SC ; and criteria of illocutions SY .
The relation fulfilsĎNSˆS expresses that a scheme node
instantiates a particular scheme. Scheme nodes, moreover, can
be one of four types: rule of inference application nodes N RAS ;
preference application nodes N PAS ; conflict application nodesN CAS ; or illocutions nodes N YAS , with S “ N RAS YN PAS YN CAS YN YAS , and N RAS , N PAS , N CAS , N YAS pairwise disjoint.
From a graphical perspective, rectangular nodes represent
information nodes, while circle ones represent scheme nodes:
black text on white for RA nodes, and white text on black for
CA nodes.
Computing the acceptability of arguments is the main scope
of using an argumentation framework [9] that consists of a set
of arguments and a binary attack relation between them.
Definition 1: An argumentation framework (AF) is a pair
Γ “ xA,Ry where A is a set of arguments and R Ď AˆA.
We say that b attacks a iff xb,ay PR, also denoted as bÑ a.
5In the following we will consider a formalisation based upon the OWL
AFI+ ontology available at http://www.arg.dundee.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/
AIF.owl (on 8 Mar 2018).
Each argumentation framework, therefore, has an associated
directed graph where the vertices are the arguments, and the
edges are the attacks.
The basic properties of conflict–freeness, acceptability, and
admissibility of a set of arguments are fundamental for the
definition of argumentation semantics.
Definition 2: Given an AF Γ “ xA,Ry:
‚ a set S Ď A is a conflict–free set of Γ if E a,b P S s.t.
aÑ b;
‚ an argument a P A is acceptable with respect to a set
S ĎA of Γ if @b PA s.t. bÑ a, D c P S s.t. cÑ b;
‚ a set S ĎA is an admissible set of Γ if S is a conflict–
free set of Γ and every element of S is acceptable with
respect to S, i.e. S Ď FΓ pSq.
An argumentation semantics σ prescribes for any AF Γ
a set of extensions, denoted as Eσ pΓ q, namely a set of sets
of arguments satisfying the conditions dictated by σ . For
instance, here is the definition of preferred (denoted as PR)
semantics.
Definition 3: Given an AF Γ “ xA,Ry, a set S Ď A is a
preferred extension of Γ , i.e. S P EPRpΓ q, iff S is a maximal
(w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set of Γ .
Given a semantics σ , an argument a is said to be credulously
accepted w.r.t. σ if a belongs to at least one σ -extension.
a is skeptically accepted w.r.t. σ if a belongs to all the σ -
extensions.
IV. SitUTrustOnto`: DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY OF
INFORMATION
Figure 3 depicts SitUTrustOnto`, a complete ontol-
ogy for dealing with uncertainty of information. It extends
SitUTrustOnto as it becomes manifest by a comparison
with Figure 2. It allows for uncertainty in information to be
expressed over an ordinal scale, implementing the right side
of Table II, cf. the UncertaintyDescriptor in the figure. This
satisfies (Des3).
Moreover, ensuring that both Illocution and Trust are sub-
classes of Node allows to express uncertainty about the
assessment of the degree of contextual trust of a source
of information as well as about the illocutionary statements
between sources and information, thus satisfying (Des4). It is
worth noticing that because Illocution is a subclass of Node,
illocutionary acts can refer to other illocutionary acts with
different degrees of uncertainty. In order to facilitate future
integration with AIF+, Scheme Node ” NS ; Information
Node ” NI ; and Illocution ” N YAS .
Let us now illustrate how SitUTrustOnto` enables us to
represent the case study we presented in Section II.
First of all, let us summarise with q MMR Causes Autism
(of type Information Node) an individual
representing the sentence depicted in Figure
1, whose language seems to suggest that
hasDescriptorpq MMR Causes Autism,q Probably trueq.
This relates to q JS MMR (type Illocution) in a way that
IllocutionaryContentpq JS MMR,q MMR Causes Autismq
and hasSourcepq JS MMR,q @JohnSmith1234567890q.
Therefore the Illocution q JS MMR informs us that
the Source q @JohnSmith1234567890 asserts the
IllocutionaryContent q MMR Causes Autism. Assuming
that @JohnSmith1234567890 does not reveal any
affiliation to university of research centre, it appears
that q JS autism trust (type Trust) is such that
hasSourcepq JS autism trust,q @JohnSmith1234567890q;
hasQuerypq JS autism trust,q MedicalDomainVaccinationsq;
hasDescriptorpq JS autism trust,q CannotBeJudgedq.
Let us consider the main finding of [24], that represents
a case of an illocutionary act referring to another
illocutionary act. Indeed, the main piece of information is
q MMR Associated Autism (“Onset of behavioural symptoms
was associated [. . . ] with measles, mumps, and rubella [MMR
ed.] vaccination”) of type Information Node. This piece
of information, according our simplified analysis in Section
II, has probability 0.67 that, according to [18], maps into
a hasDescriptorpq MMR Associated Autism,q Possibly trueq.
Such a piece of information is contained
in an illocutionary act q P MMR such that
IllocutionaryContentpq P MMR,q MMR Associated Autismq
and hasSourcepq P MMR,q Parentsq, with an
associated trust assessment q P autism trust
where hasSourcepq P autism trust,q Parentsq;
hasQuerypq P autism trust,q MedicalDomainVaccinationq;
hasDescriptorpq P autism trust,q FairlyReliableq (although
parents might not have a medical degree, they might best
positioned to identify first symptoms).
We can now treat [24] as a source per se,
hence having q W P MMR (type Illocution) such
that IllocutionaryContentpq W P MMR,q P MMRq,
and hasSourcepq W P MMR,q Wakefield et al., 1998q.
Moreover, its trust assessment q W P MMR trust—
given that [24] has been published on The Lancet,
a prestigious medical journal—should be such that
hasSourcepq W P MMR trust,q Wakefield et al., 1998q;
hasQuerypq W P MMR trust,q MedicalDomainVaccinationq;
hasDescriptorpq W P MMR trust,q CompletelyReliableq.
Finally, let us consider [15] and its main finding
q No Associations (type Information node) that comes with
hasDescriptorpq No Associations,q Confirmed by other sourcesq
according to the naı¨ve probabilistic evaluation in Section II
and [18], after the approximation of 0.9994 to 1.0 (1:1666
error). In addition, there are two symmetric instances of the
conflicting scheme Logical Conflict between q No Associations
and q MMR Associated Autism, cf. [7]. q No Associations
comes to the illocutionary act q M MMR (type Illocution)
such that IllocutionaryContentpq M MMR,q No Associationsq
and hasSourcepq M MMR,q Madsen et al., 2002q. Similarly
as per [24], [15] has been published in a respectable medical
journal, hence its trust assessment q M MMR trust is such
that hasSourcepq M MMR trust,q Madsen et al., 2002q;
hasQuerypq M MMR trust,q MedicalDomainVaccinationq;
hasDescriptorpq M MMR trust,q CompletelyReliableq.
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Fig. 3. Graphical representation of SitUTrustOnto`: nodes with q are individuals, otherwise atomic concept. Edges are labelled with is-a (subclass relations),
with type (membership assertion); and with atomic roles. Differently from Figure 2, inverse relationships have been omitted for improving the readability.
The parts in common with Figure 2 are depicted in grey.
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Fig. 4. Networks depicting the formal assessment of arguments considered
in the case study discussed in Section II. Greek letters are shortcut labels to
ease references in the text.
V. MANAGING CONFLICTS IN INFORMATION AND TRUST
ON SOURCES
Figure 4 provides a snapshot of the process of conjectures
and refutation [17] at the basis of scientific enquiry, with
formal account of uncertainty on claimed pieces of information
as well as variable degrees of trustworthiness associated to
sources. It also illustrates the main contribution of our study—
in addition to the SitUTrustOnto` ontology described in
Section IV—namely: (1) a conceptual shift towards having
arguments about uncertainty assessment of information, which
also require to consider probabilistic inconsistencies as conflict
schemes; (2) methodologies for generating arguments with
fused uncertainty assessments of information explicitly rep-
resented as argumentative inferences; (3) representing illocu-
tionary acts as arguments instances of a modified, recursive,
version of the argumentation scheme from witness testimony.
As per the conceptual shift towards having arguments about
uncertain, let us consider statements θ and . θ states that “It
is q Confirmed by other sources that q No Associations” while
 that “It is q PossiblyTrue that q MMR Associated Autism,”
and from Section IV we also know that q No Associations“
 q MMR Associated Autism. Hence this is a case where there
is a probabilistic inconsistency between these two statement
[4] as both their uncertainty assessment are quite high (greater
than 0.5) and they are logically conflicting. This approach
is rather different from current views in probabilistic ar-
gumentation [13], where there are two main families of
approaches to probabilistic argumentation: constellation ap-
proaches, where arguments and attacks are uncertain; and epis-
temic approaches, where there is uncertainty about whether an
argument is believed. We will discuss connections with that
literature in future work.
As per representing fusion of uncertain information, let
us consider the statements α, β, and δ. They all refer to
q MMR Causes Autism, but they serve three distinct epistemic
purposes. β represents the illocutionary act performed by
q @JohnSmith1234567890; δ represents the results of a statis-
tical inference based upon a (undefined, but rather straightfor-
ward to derive) argumentation scheme from probabilistic cor-
relation to cause; and α is the result of a fusion operator over
β and δ, in the case a final summary uncertainty assessment
is necessary, and under the assumption that such as fusion
depends only on β and δ: more articulated fusion operators
perhaps taking into consideration the totality of evidence can
be envisaged, and we will explore them in future work.
Regarding representing illocutionary acts as arguments
themselves, we rely on an evolution of the argumentation
scheme from witness testimony, where the truth telling premise
is modified into “Witness W is telling the truth with reliability
assessment T:” γ , ζ, η, ι are examples of such statements.
Such an evolution is inspired by [16], where trust is explicitly
mentioned in argumentation schemes, albeit not represented
with measures of uncertainty.
In addition, the discussion in Section II suggests the need
for an extended AIF+ model, where sources of information
can witness illocutionary acts of other sources, as it is the
case of q Wakefield et al., 1998 witnessing the illocutionary act
of q Parents. From a sintactic point of view, Figure 4 is not
compliant with AIF+: it also raises questions on the semantics
of the logical relationships we are representing there. Indeed
if η is the premise of an instance of the argumentation scheme
from witness testimony, it is immediate to conclude that there
must be a conclusion for such an argument, hence we can
introduce the equivalent of a Skolem term [14]. For instance,
using simple logic (cf. Section III), we would introduce a new
term τ and write the following two rules pη Ñ τq, and pζ^
τ Ñ q. We will explore further these aspects in future work.
Linked to the above point, also the acceptability status of
argument needs to be reconsidered. Indeed, from Figure 4, we
can derive the following two arguments: a “ xtι, ι Ñ δu,δy,
and b “ xtη,ζ,η Ñ τ,ζ,τ Ñ u,y with δ “  and  “ δ,
hence having a and b mutually conflicting (simple rebut).
Questions now relate to (1) how to derive a meaningful
measure of uncertainty for the arguments as a whole (e.g. using
discounting operators); and (2) the effects on trustworthiness
of sources as well as uncertainty assessments considered
in arguments deemed to be unacceptable according to an
argumentation semantics (cf. Section III-B), hence providing
specific semantics to the (Des4), sintactically addressed in
Section IV. It is also worth mentioning that a meaningful
function deriving the strength of an argument should not be
based only upon the uncertainty assessment of information
and of sources of information, but also on the quality of the
argumentation itself including answers to critical questions—
i.e. an argument should not be considered warranted unless
reasonable answers to each critical question are provided
[27]—and reasonable standards for burden of proof [26].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a computational methodology for
evaluating trust associated to sources of information in scien-
tific enquiry. In particular, we expand on [5] to present a com-
plete ontology for dealing with uncertainty in information and
in sources of information thus satisfiying the four desiderata
discussed in Section II. Moreover, since in scientific enquiry—
as well as in other settings such as situational understanding,
i.e. CISpaces.org [22]—pieces of information links together
to form arguments, we explicitly link the AIF+ [7], [19], [20]
ontology. We also present novel extensions to formal argu-
mentation theories, in particular: (1) a conceptual shift towards
having arguments about uncertainty assessment of information,
which also require to consider probabilistic inconsistencies as
conflict schemes; (2) methodologies for generating arguments
with fused uncertainty assessments of information explicitly
represented as argumentative inferences; and (3) representing
illocutionary acts as arguments themselves, in particular as
instances of a modified, recursive version of the argumentation
scheme from witness testimony [27].
As part of future work we plan to evaluate techniques for
automatic evaluation of trust: we will investigate how topic
modelling—i.e. automatically identifying relevant topics in
a written document, for instance using the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) [3]—and similarities of sources—e.g. arti-
cles in The Lancet are more similar to articles in the New
England Journal of Medicine rather than to articles in the
Daily Mail—can help suggesting trust measures for new pieces
of information. Moreover, we will also investigate how to
automatically identify problems with default assumptions, i.e.
questioning whether there is enough evidence suggesting that
a default assignment needs to be revisited.
The ultimate goal of our research is to support any analyst
in their scientific enquiry. We will therefore consider natural
language interfaces to formal argumentation [6], also building
on top of the CISpaces.org project, as well as conversational
interfaces based on controlled natural language, e.g. [23], to
better support analysts in their activities.
In future work we will compare with other approaches to
argue about trustworthiness of sources as recently presented
in literature, such as [11]. Moreover, we will also consider
similarities and limitations of this approach w.r.t. approaches
for qualitative decision under uncertainty [8].
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